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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the above-entitled Court by 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
(PRESERVATION OF APPEAL ON THE RECORD) 
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty to said third degree felony 
to allow the Appellant to challenge the Court's denial of Appellant's Motion to 
Suppress. 
1. The Kane County Deputy Sheriff, Dan Watson, without the reasonable 
suspicion or requisite probable cause, unlawfully seized, detained, and searched the 
Defendant's vehicle, after his initial reasons for the stop (speeding) had been 
concluded or abandoned. Apparently, Deputy Watson never started to write a 
citation for speeding. Preserved for appeal at (R. 74-75). 
Conclusions of law in criminal cases are reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Thurman 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). State v, Brown, 852 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992). 
Supporting authorities are: State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), and Terry v 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d (1968). 
2. When Deputy Watson, operating alone, left his truck radio unattended, and 
removed his dog from the truck, he purposefully stopped forward progress on the 
stated reason and purpose for the initial stop, thereby abandoning same. According 
to Deputy Watson, he performed the same ritual on three fourths (3/4) of the 
dozen, or so, stops he made daily in his capacity as patrol deputy. The Deputy had 
absolutely no grounds for suspicion of anything, other than speeding, when he 
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started his search of Appellant's pickup. Preserved for appeal at (R. 156 p. 6711. 
19-22). 
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Thurman, supra. Supporting 
authorities are: State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), State v. Mendoza, 
748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987), and United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 83 
L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). 
3. Without probable cause, without a search warrant, without any factors being 
present to constitute any recognized exception to the warrant requirement, Deputy 
Watson failed to ask for, or obtain, consent of any of the occupants of Appellant's 
truck prior to searching the same. Preserved for appeal at (R. 71). 
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Thurman, supra. Supporting 
authorities are: State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989). State v Mendoza, 
748 P.2d 181,183 (Utah 1987), and United States v Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 83 L. 
Ed 2d 604 (1985). 
4. The Deputy's stated reason for taking his Narcotics Detector Dog, Rudy, to the 
driver's door of the Appellant's pickup, while the Appellant, his two adult 
passengers, and the infant child, were still seated inside, was to announce his 
intention to walk his dog around the truck and to inform the occupants of the truck 
not to dismount the vehicle. This action amounted to "seizing" the truck and it's 
occupants for his non-consensual investigative purposes. Preserved for appeal at 
(R. 156 p. 115). Deputy Watson had no articulable, reasonable, suspicion or 
probable cause, and he did not ask for consent or receive valid, voluntary, 
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permission to do a search of the vehicle, nor did he request or obtain a warrant at 
any time during the stop, or the subsequent trip to the Kane County Sheriffs Office, 
where the bed of the truck was completely dismantled. The Deputy had not 
arrested anyone when he first searched the pickup and found the physical evidence. 
Preserved for appeal at (R. 9) Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. 
Thurman, supra. Supporting authorities are: State v. Schlosser, 114 P.2d 1132 
(Utah 1989). State v Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181,183 (Utah 1987), and United States v 
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 83 L. Ed 2d 604 (1985). 
5. Damaris Juarez, the Appellant's adult daughter, told Deputy Watson that the 
Appellant did not speak English when the Deputy first asked to see their papers. 
Deputy Watson did not speak Spanish. There is circumstantial evidence, and 
direct testimony, that supports the Appellant's contention that the confessions were 
obtained through coercive police interrogation techniques, and language designed 
to manipulate, dominate, and nullify Defendant's free and unconstrained choice. 
Deputy Watson threatened to incarcerate Defendant Juarez's daughter when there 
was absolutely no evidence that she possessed any knowledge of the marijuana. 
He threatened to remove Defendant's infant grandchild to foster care. Deputy 
Watson's threats, combined with the act of actually removing the infant from the 
mother, coerced Defendant Juarez to make a confession, when he had adamantly 
denied any knowledge, or involvement, in criminal activity prior to that time. 
The State has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
statements, admissions, and/or confessions, made by Appellant, were obtained in 
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accordance with principles espoused in Miranda, and that the Appellant 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. There is 
circumstantial evidence, and direct testimony, that indicates the confession was 
obtained through coercion and Appellant's ignorance of his fundamental rights. 
The Appellant could not speak or understand English. The translation by Trooper 
Davis, as the interpreter, is problematic. During his interrogation, Appellant raised 
a question regarding the purpose of a lawyer; after that, no officer told Appellant 
that he had the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney present 
during questioning. The State has produced no evidence, other that the statement 
of the interrogating officers, that Appellant understood and waived the rights 
afforded him under Miranda, the Fifth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution, and the Constitution of the State of Utah. In spite of the fact 
that they had recording equipment available to them at all times, it was never used 
until the defendant started telling them what they wanted to hear. Preserved for 
appeal at (R. 67). Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Thurman, 
supra. Supporting authorities are: State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989). 
State v Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181,183 (Utah 1987) and United States v Hensley, 469 
U.S. 221, 83 L. Ed 2d 604 (1985). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final order of Judgment and Sentence for one count of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, Marijuana, a Third 
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Degree Felony. This conviction is based upon Appellant's conditional plea of 
guilty to said charge to enable him to appeal the Trial Court's denial of his motion 
to suppress. 
At the suppression hearing, counsel for the parties stipulated that the transcript 
of the preliminary hearing should be made a part of the record and considered by 
the Court as evidence on the suppression issues. The Court accepted the 
stipulation. (R. 130, p. 11) (R. 158, p. 4). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The controlling statutes and constitutional provisions are found in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 20,1996, approximately 8:00 P.M., DEPUTY, DANIEL LEWIS 
WATSON, at that time a patrol deputy for the Kane County, Utah, Sheriffs 
Office, traveling eastbound, activated his forward radar gun and stopped a pickup 
truck westbound on highway 89, about milepost 62, for driving 68 mph, thereby 
exceeding the posted speed limit of 55 mph. Defendant, MANUEL DOMINGUEZ 
JUAREZ, was driving, ANGEL DOMINGUEZ RASCON, was a passenger, and 
Defendant Juarez's eighteen year old daughter, DAMARIS JUAREZ, and her two 
year old child, also occupied the single seat vehicle. (R. 156 p. 12-15) (R. 158, p. 
13,11. 3-25, p. 14,11. 1-8). The Defendant driver and his male passenger, could not 
speak or understand English. The Defendant's daughter was the only person at the 
initial stop who was bilingual. The Defendant's daughter was pressed in to service, 
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at times, as the language interpreter during the initial stop. (R. 156 p. 15 L 9-15) 
(R. 158, p. 20,11. 19-24). Deputy Watson obtained the license of the driver and the 
registration for the vehicle (R. 156 p. 1611. 11-24) (R. 158, p. 14,11. 9-16) and 
demanded identification from the Defendant's daughter and his passenger, Mr. 
Rascon. (R. 156 p. 1611. 11-17). When the Defendant's daughter asked why he 
needed her identification Deputy Watson stated, if she was going translate / 
interpret for him, he needed to know who he was doing business with. (R. 156 p. 
1611. 11-15) Deputy Watson's examination of the identification papers found them 
satisfactory, but then, returned to his radio-equipped vehicle to run a check with his 
radio dispatcher. Instead of remaining on purpose by completing his 
communication with the dispatcher, (R.156 p. 1611. 21-24) Deputy Watson, 
without any reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, (R. 156 p. 1711. 
9-12), elected to take his dog, RUDY, (R. 156 1711. 12-25, p. 1811. 1-19), a 
certified Narcotics Detector Dog, from the patrol truck he was driving. (R. 156 p. 
1611. 21-24). He testified that he had no particular reason to take the dog from the 
vehicle at that time. (R. 156 p. 1711. 9-12). He then took the dog to the driver's 
side door of the Defendant's vehicle. (R. 156 p. 1711. 13-15,11. 19-24) (R 158 p. 60 
11. 19). Deputy Watson did not ask permission to search the vehicle or for 
permission to have the dog check the vehicle. (R. 156 p. 171. 25, p 1811. 1-6) {R 
158 p. 6011.21-22). Standing at the driver's door with the dog, Deputy Watson 
instructed the occupants to remain in the vehicle and to roll up their windows and 
turn their vent on high, (emphasis added) (R. 158 p. 6011. 23-24). 
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Q. What happened next? 
A. I started on the driver's front side by the bumper and I gave Rudy her 
search command and walked her around along the driver's side of the vehicle to the 
tailgate and along the back of the tailgate."(R. 156 p. 1811. 7 - 11) (R 158 p.6011. 
25, p. 61,11. 1-3) (emphasis added) 
According to Deputy Watson, the dog indicated reactions only on the seam 
of the right side [passengers side] of the tailgate, of the pickup bed. (R. 156 p. 18 
11. 20-24) (R. 158 p. 6111. 3-5) . 
Q. "... what is Rudy's reaction when she indicates on something? 
A. Rudy is an aggressive indicator. She will scratch, bite, or bark at the - -
at the source of the odor that she detects." (emphasis added) (R. 156 p. 1811. 15-
19). 
We have two different scenarios from Deputy Watson's testimony about 
how, and when, he caged the Narcotics Detector Dog, Rudy, following the dog's 
reaction on the right rear seam of the tailgate of the Defendant's pickup. First 
Deputy Watson states he returned the dog to the security of his police vehicle 
before going to the Defendant and asking him to step out of his truck. (R. 156 p. 19 
11. 3-10). During cross examination, in response to a question as to whether or not 
the Narcotics Detector Dog, Rudy, had ever been up in the bed of the Defendant's 
pickup truck, Deputy Watson responds that the Detector Dog jumped into the bed 
of the defendant's pickup, when the Defendant dropped the tailgate, during an 
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interrogation of the Defendant at the back of the pickup. Deputy Watson also 
states that the dog gave no indication of the presence of narcotics while the dog 
was in the bed of the pickup. (R. 156 p. 5211. 21-25, p. 53 11. 1-15). 
Following the stated indication at the seam of the tailgate, in English, 
Deputy Watson asked the driver, who could not speak or understand English, to get 
out of the vehicle,(R. 158 p.61,11. 6 -7 ) and took him out of earshot of the 
daughter who could speak and understand English (R. 156 p. 19 11. 9-25). Deputy 
Watson asked the defendant why the dog was indicating on his truck. In response, 
according to the Deputy, he received a blank stare that caused him to realize that 
the Defendant truly did not speak English (R. 156 p. 1911. 25, p.2011. 1-2). 
Attempting to obey Deputy Watson's demanding demeanor, the Defendant opened 
the tailgate and pulled a suitcase to the back of the tailgate. (R. 156 p. 2011. 4-
8).(R 158 p. 57,11. 19 - 23). It was at that time, Deputy Watson claims that he 
noticed that double stick tape was used to hold the bed-liner to the bed of the 
pickup and the left rear corner of the driver's side of the bed-liner had separated 
from the tape (R. 156 p. 2011. 15-24) approximately one-half inch to one inch. (R. 
9 para 411. 3). Without asking the Defendant's consent (R. 156 p. 20 11. 25, p. 21 
11. 1-2), the Deputy pulled that left-hand corner end of the liner, at the rear of the 
vehicle, further away from the pickup bed, after engaging a flashlight which, 
enabled him to see into the space between the liner and the pickup. (R. 156 p.2111. 
3-13 p. 23,11. 1-5). Although it was still daylight at this time, apparently, the 
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Deputy needed a flashlight to see down the side of the truck between the bed-liner 
and the pickup bed, where he observed packages which, appeared to be wrapped in 
tape and stowed forward three to four feet (R. 156 p.21,11. 17-22 p. 10111. 5-13) 
toward the cab of the truck. (R. 156 p. 2111. 20-22). According to Deputy Watson, 
who says he speaks very little Spanish, (R. 156 p. 23 11. 13-14) he had the 
Defendant, who was still unaccompanied by an interpreter, (R. 156 p. 23 11. 10-12), 
look inside the bed-liner at the packages and, at that time, the defendant threw up 
his hands and stated, in broken English, what sounded to Deputy Watson like (R. 
156 p. 23,11. 19-20), "It's not my truck." (R. 156 p. 23 11. 8-21). The Deputy then 
called for backup, examined the liner on the passenger side and observed similar 
types of packages. (R. 156 p. 23 11. 23-25 p.2411. 1-9). Trooper John Davis, who 
spoke Spanish, arrived at the scene and placed Defendant Juarez in the back of his 
vehicle and both officers removed Mr. Rascon from the passenger side of the 
vehicle and handcuffed him. (R. 156 p. 24 11. 10B25 p. 25 11. 1-2) They then 
removed Ms. Juarez and infant from the vehicle, handcuffed her, and placed her 
under arrest. (R. 156 p. 25 11. 3-12). Chief Deputy Allen Johnson also arrived at the 
scene and all the three adults, the baby and the truck were taken to the Kane 
County jail. (R. 156 p. 25 11. 13-25 p. 26 11. 1-17). In the jail parking lot, the bed-
liner was removed exposing 31 packages weighing a total of 67.31 pounds that a 
later analysis determined to contain marijuana. (R. 156 p. 2811. 10-14, p. 4711. 4-
25, p. 48, p. 4911. 1-21). 
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At the Sheriffs Office, each of the suspects were interviewed separately on 
at least two different occasions in the presence of the three officers; Deputy 
Watson, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, John Davis and Kane County Sheriffs 
Chief Deputy, Allen Johnson. (R.156 p. 2911. 16-19). Trooper Davis, who admits 
his Spanish fluency is less that one hundred percent, (R. 156 p.7611. 3-6), 
translated during the interrogation of the Spanish-speaking suspects. (R. 156 p. 33, 
36 p. 7611. 12-17) The Appellant, and each of his passengers, was first given the 
Miranda warning after Trooper Davis arrived at the scene of the stop. (R. 156 p. 24 
11. 11-25, p. 25 11. 1-2). They were given a second Miranda warning at the Sheriffs 
Office and denied any knowledge of the existence of any drugs. (R. 156 p. 30, p. 
3111. 1-23, p. 32, 36). After the completion of the first set of interrogations, a re-
interview of each of the parties began and the question and answer process was 
repeated. (R. 156 pp. 37, 41, 44). Ms. Juarez again denied any knowledge of the 
circumstances surrounding the drugs. (R. 156 p. 3811. 21-24). During the second 
interview of Mr. Juarez, the Appellant, continued to deny any knowledge regarding 
the marijuana. Deputy Watson advised the Appellant that if Ms. Juarez were 
arrested, her baby, his grandchild, would be taken from her and would be placed 
in foster care. (R. 156 p. 6111. 25, p. 6211. 1-3 p. 86-87, p. 9711. 14-25 p. 9811. 1-
18,112-113). Deputy Watson then left the interrogation room, accosted Ms. 
Juarez, telling her, that because of her father's refusal to cooperate, her baby would 
be taken from her and placed with a foster family and she would be booked, 
arrested and held. Then and there, her baby was taken from her by Deputy Watson 
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and carried to the open door of the interrogation room (R. 156 p. 6211. 16-25 p. 63 
11. 1-6) and then past the open door of the interrogation room (R. 156 p. 6211. 16-
25 p. 63 11. 6) to the dispatching area. (R. 156 p. 41 11. 21-25 P 421. 1). Deputy 
Watson then returned to the interview room without the Appellant's grandchild. 
Trooper Davis advised Deputy Watson that Defendant Juarez had now agreed to 
take the blame. (R. 156 p. 4211. 2-8). The Appellant then, in a question and answer 
interrogation by Trooper Davis in Trooper Davis' Spanish, acknowledged 
involvement in transporting the Marijuana and this statement was recorded. (R. 
156 pp. 40,42-44, 63 11. 2-6, pp. 86-88,100, 101, p. 3211. 22-25 p. 33 11. 1). No 
other conversations were recorded that evening, not the Miranda warnings and not 
even the first part of the Appellant's conversation when he confessed. From the 
testimony of Deputy Johnson as to the position of the Appellant in the 
interrogation room, the Appellant could have observed Deputy Watson with the 
child after the removal of the child from the mother. (R. 156 p. 11411. 2-7). During 
the second interview of Mr. Juarez, he asked the interrogating Officers what was 
the purpose of a lawyer. (R. 156 p. 10111. 14-18, 22-24). Trooper Davis testified he 
told Mr. Juarez, (R. 156 p. 102 11. 7-10) " . . . lawyers legal counsel explain to you 
your rights, what the laws are, and what basically what you need, can and can't do, 
need to do, as far as the whole situation goes." (R. 156 p. 102 L. 4-10). After that, 
Trooper Davis states, it was quiet for a little while, as Deputy Watson was out of 
the room on his errand and finally, according to Trooper Davis, the Defendant said 
Listen, I'll go and come clean with you. Or according to Trooper Davis, "Okay. I'll 
n 
take the blame for it." (R. 156 p.9911. 24-25 p. 100,11. 1-5). 
Soon thereafter, Damaris Juarez and her baby were released from jail and 
she was not booked, nor was she charged with any crime. (R. 110 para 28 and 31) 
(R. 157 p 8 11. 5-7)(R. 158, p. 6911. 18 - 22) 
Q. " I trust that you or someone made a decision not to file charges 
against Mz. Juarez, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Who made that decision, and why? 
A. I did, based on the fact that urn, her father confirmed that she didn't 
know anything about the packages." (R. 156 p. 3211. 4-9). 
The recorded confession, (R. 156 p. 3911. 17-25, p. 40) was transcribed by 
the prosecution and in the end notes of the official transcriber he complains about 
the lack of the Troopers understanding of, certain Spanish verbs, subject pronouns, 
and how the person asking the questions doesn't understand the rather basic 
conjugation of the verb "poner". (R. 65 para 3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Point I: In this case, using the opportunity of a routine traffic violation to 
initiate a search of Defendant's pickup with the aid of a drug dog, with absolutely 
no prerequisite probable cause, as Deputy Watson does on seventy five percent of 
the travelers that this officer contacts, (R. 156 p. 6711. 19-22) flies in the face of 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Constitution of 
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the State of Utah. 
See Boydv. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 633 (1886) as follows: 
"For the unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the 
Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of 
compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in 
criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and 
compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness against 
himself,' which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws 
light on the question as to what is an unreasonable search and 
seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 
Also, see U.S. v. Vertigo-Arcades, 494 U. S. 159, 265 (1990). 
Point II: Extending the time of a traffic stop to do a dog search of a vehicle 
has been upheld in other jurisdictions, but, in those cases, they had, reasonable 
articulable suspicion, or requisite probable cause or two officers, one working 
the traffic stop and the second handling the dog. The two-man operation 
satisfied the requirement, in those jurisdictions, of not extending the time 
required for the primary reason for the stop. See State v Williams, 565 So.2d 714 
(Fla. 3d DC A (1990). fn the instant case, we have only one officer; one without 
reasonable articulable suspicion or the requisite probable cause; one who cannot 
simultaneously be on the radio in his car and out searching a vehicle with an 
aggressive dog while the vehicle is occupied by scared, non-English speaking 
travelers; one officer, who cannot claim he is not artificially extending the time 
of the stop. 
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Point III. Deputy Watson had no factors constituting recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement when he initiated his search with the help 
of his dog; he did not ask permission to search the Appellant's truck. Deputy 
Watson stopped the Appellant's pickup for speeding and without any reasonable 
suspicion of any other law violations or criminal conduct, he released his 
Narcotics Detector Dog, approached the drivers side of Appellant's pickup, 
advised the occupants that he was going to have his drug dog do a "drug 
detection." He then started a "walk around" of Appellant's pickup; he gave his 
dog the "search command" and at the rear of the pickup, the dog, Rudy, made a 
"hit". That "hit" led the Deputy to tear apart the bed of the truck and the 
subsequent discovery of marijuana between the bed-liner and the bed of the 
Appellant's pickup truck. (R. 156 p.2111. 19-22). 
The above actions of Deputy Watson constitute a search of the Appellant's 
pickup truck without any probable cause whatsoever and without even a scintilla 
of any indication that Appellant or his passengers had done anything illegal 
except exceed the speed limit. 
Without probable cause, or a search warrant, and no factor being present to 
constitute any recognized exception to the warrant requirement, Deputy Watson 
failed to ask for, or obtain, consent from any of the occupants of Appellant's 
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truck prior to searching the same. 
If the dog indicating on the right seam of the tailgate is probable cause, then a 
warrant should have been obtained before tearing apart the vehicle on the 
highway. The separation of the bed-liner from double-sided tape in the western 
dry climate is no surprise. The movement of the rear end, left corner, of the bed-
liner, one-half to one inch, after the tape loses its adhesion, shouldn't arouse 
surprise; it doesn't create exigent circumstances. Since that separated corner is 
four feet away, on the opposite side of the truck from the only area hit on by the 
dog, it is not probable cause. 
Said search was grossly unconstitutional. 
POINT IV: Deputy Watson had no articulable reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause, and he did not ask for consent or receive valid voluntary 
permission to do a search of the vehicle, nor did he request or obtain a warrant at 
any time during the stop or the subsequent trip to the Kane county sheriffs office 
where the bed of the truck was completely dismantled. 
Deputy Watson had not arrested anyone at the time he physically pulled the 
left rear end of the bed-liner aside, as far as he could get it to move, and even in 
daylight, he still needed a flashlight to see the packages, three to four feet 
toward the front of the truck bed, between the liner and the side wall of the 
pickup. His stated probable cause was that his Narcotics Detector Dog had 
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indicated on the tailgate seam on the opposite side of the truck. 
Point V. When an Officer of the law, who speaks no Spanish, questions a 
person who speaks no English, then acts on a perceived response to that 
interrogation, he occupies very thin ice if he testifies that the stringent 
requirements of Miranda have been met. One could wonder if the Appellant 
would have gotten a better answer if he had asked the purpose of a bathroom 
than he received when he asked the purpose of a lawyer. The explanation he did 
receive in response to his inquiry, as to the purpose of a lawyer, is a more 
accurate description of a judge, hi the instance, it was incumbent upon the 
Trooper to speak the words, in the best Spanish he could muster, "do you want 
an attorney present?" That did not happen. There is no indication in the record 
that Appellant ever waived his Miranda rights. 
Further, there is clear evidence in the record that, before Appellant confessed, 
Deputy Watson threatened to have Appellant's daughter arrested and to have his 
infant grandchild placed in foster care. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
POINT I. THE MINOR VIOLATION BY THE DEFENDANT OF A 
TRAFFIC RULE DID NOT PROVIDE REASONABLE SUSPICION 
OR PROBABLE CAUSE TO ALLOW DEPUTY WATSON TO 
LOOSE HIS NARCOTICS DETECTOR DOG AND SEARCH THE 
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DEFENDANT'S TRUCK. 
That this was a search of Appellant's vehicle by Deputy Watson with the 
assistance of his dog, Rudy, is clear from the testimony of Deputy Watson. 
The following portions of his testimony from the transcript make it clear 
as to when the Deputy seized the Appellant's vehicle and its occupants and when 
the search of said vehicle began. 
After Deputy Watson's initial contact with the occupants of Appellant's 
pickup truck, where Deputy Watson had found nothing unusual or out of order 
(R. 156 p. 14II. 25-p. 17), he returned to his vehicle, called dispatch and took his 
drug detection dog from his patrol vehicle (R.156 p. 16II. 20-24). 
The following then occurred: 
Q Did you command her (dog) to do anything? (Parentheses added) 
A Yes, I did. 
Q I gave her~well, first I went up to the window and explained to 
them what I was gonna do, that I was gonna walk my dog around 
their truck. 
Q Which side of the vehicle did you approach to make that 
explanation? 
A The driver's side. 
Q And did you, in fact, inform the occupants of the vehicle that you 
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intended to have Rudy, do a drug detection, for lack of a better word? 
A Correct. I just - 1 explained to everybody just to sit tight. I was 
gonna walk my dog around their car. (emphasis added) That way they don't ~ 
so people that are nervous about dogs, I don't want them to try to get out or 
anything. 
Q What happened next? 
A I started on the driver's front side by the bumper and I gave Rudy 
her search command and walked her around along the driver's side of the 
vehicle to the tailgate and along the back of the tailgate, (emphasis added) 
Q There's a term that we use often, regarding Rudy, "indicate". Did 
Rudy indicate on this vehicle? 
A Yes, she did. 
Q In this situation or in situations generally, what is Rudy's reaction 
when she indicates on something? 
A Rudy is an aggressive indicator. She will scratch, bite, or bark at 
the —at the source of the odor that she detects, (emphasis added) 
Q Where did Rudy indicate on this vehicle? 
A She indicated on the seam of the tailgate on the right side, the 
passengers' side of the tailgate, (emphasis added) 
Q Anywhere else? 
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A No. (R. 156p.l7Il. 16-p.l8) 
Deputy Watson seized the pickup and its occupants when he told " . . . 
everybody just to sit tight." That he was just going to walk his dog around their 
vehicle. At that point, the Deputy had nothing upon which base any suspicion of 
any illegal activity by anyone. 
He activated the search of Appellant's vehicle when he . . . gave Rudy her 
search command and walked her around along the driver's side of the 
vehicle. . . . " 
A new wrinkle turns up in the suppression hearing, where, under cross 
examination, Deputy Watson, at (R. 158, p. 60,11. 15-24), gives this story: 
I stopped the truck and went to the driver. I then obtained their 
identification. I then went back to my truck. I radioed in a request for a 
drivers license check and a vehicle registration check. While I was waiting 
for that to come back,, I got my dog out of the back of the truck. I went up 
to the driver of the truck with the dog. I informed them I was gonna walk 
the dog around the outside of the car. I asked them to stay in the truck. 1 
asked them to roll up their windows and turn their vent on high, (emphasis 
added) 
By ordering the occupants of the vehicle to "roll up the windows and turn 
the vent on high" this was a search of the inside odors of the pickup, and a search 
of the odors of the occupants of the vehicle, under the pretext of an exterior search 
by the Deputy, with the assistance of his dog. Deputy Watson elevated this stop to 
a level two detention by effectively seizing the vehicle and the occupants therein. 
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The act was tantamount to the opening of the car door. Quoting State v. James, 
977 P.2d 489,1999 UT App 17, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (Utah App. 01/28/1999) 
[25] I. Legality of Opening the Door 
[26] "Although a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in a car 
than in his or her home, one does not lose the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment while in an automobile." State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 
1132, 1135 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (citation omitted); see also New York v. 
Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114-15, 106 S. Ct. 960, 966 (1986) ("[A] car's interior 
as a whole is . . . subject to Fourth Amendment protection from 
unreasonable intrusions by the police."). Upon stopping a driver to 
investigate a possible traffic violation, an officer may temporarily detain the 
driver, passengers, and vehicle to examine the vehicle registration and 
driver's license. See Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135. For protection, the officer 
may also direct the driver to exit the vehicle. See id. If no arrest ensues, 
the officer may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle only when 
(l)probable cause supports it or (2) the officer is able to articulate 
reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be dangerous. See id. 
[27] It is well settled that a police officer's opening of a vehicle's 
door constitutes a search. See Class, 475 U.S. at 115, 106 S. Ct. at 966 
(holding that officer's opening of driver's side door to see vehicle 
identification number was search under Fourth Amendment); Larocco, 794 
P.2d at 466 (concluding that "constitutional privacy interest exists in 
the interior of an automobile and that the opening of the car door by the 
police officer here constituted a search"); Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1137 
(stating that officer's "action of opening the car door constituted a 
search, not an investigative detention, and therefore, the probable cause 
standard was correctly applied by the trial court"); see also Arizona v. 
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325,107 S. Ct. 1149, 1152-53 (1987) (stating that 
even minor intrusion beyond legitimate scope of initially legal 
investigation violates Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 
487 L.Ed.2d 238, 239-40 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (suppressing evidence 
from car stop because "officer had no right to open the car door"). We 
must thus initially reject out of hand the State's rather cursory contention 
that Trooper Kendrick's action was not a search, but part of his valid 
investigative detention of James. 
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All of that searching without a scrap of probable cause is, undoubtedly, what 
the framers of the constitution had in mind when they wrote Article I, Section 14, 
of the Utah Constitution. 
The appellant does not dispute Deputy Watson's right to stop the truck in 
question. However, the burden is on the State to show that a warrantless search 
is lawful. See, State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah App. 1984). 
"Again,... even if the circumstances are such that the police are excused from 
the necessity of having a search warrant for an automobile, they are nevertheless 
authorized to conduct a search of a vehicle for evidence only if they possess 
probable cause that particular items of evidence are presently concealed therein." 
(emphasis added) Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, Second Edition 1987, 
section 5.2(c). The United States Supreme Court defines probable cause as facts 
and circumstances within (the officers') knowledge sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is 
being committed. See, Brinegar v. United States, 388 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
After a routine traffic stop, the detaining officer must be able to articulate a 
particular and objective basis for their suspicions that is drawn from the totality 
of the circumstances facing them at the time of the seizure. See, United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981). The State bears the burden of 
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establishing both probable cause and exigent circumstances in order for a 
warrantless search to fall within the automobile exception to the requirements of 
Art. I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. See, State v. Larrocco, 19A P.2d 
460, 470 (Utah 1990). 
In State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990), the court held that 
troopers did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to 
justify continued detention and questioning of defendants once warning citation 
was given and purpose for initial stop had been accomplished. In Robinson, 
Defendants appealed their conviction of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance found while troopers were conducting a routine traffic stop. Officers 
stopped the vehicle for improper passing. The officers made a routine check on 
the driver's license and vehicle registration and found the vehicle was not 
registered to either of the occupants. The defendants explained that their boss at 
a floor covering business had allowed them to take the work van on a two-week 
fishing trip to Wyoming. While checking out their story, the officers noted the 
nervousness of the occupants and observed that a homemade bed, two feet high, 
filled the back of the vehicle. Based on what they observed, the trooper 
determined to ask consent to search the vehicle. Id., at 433. The Defendant, 
Robinson, consented and the troopers observed five marijuana seeds in the rear 
corner of the van. When the officers failed to get consent from Robinson to look 
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under the bed, the officers stated that they would attempt to get a search warrant. 
Officer Ogden then asked Robinson, "Since you won't let us take the plywood 
panel off the van to look under the bed, would it be all right if we let a dog go 
through the vehicle?" Robinson replied, "Yes," and asked if allowing the dog to 
sniff meant giving consent to search. The Officer said "yes" and Robinson shook 
his head affirmatively. The defendants were later arrested when the dog gave a 
positive alert at the rear of the bed in the van and the trooper located eight duffel 
bags of marijuana in the space under the bed. Id, at 434. The court concluded 
that, in light of the troopers' questioning and conduct, the coercive atmosphere 
at the time, and the other surrounding circumstances, the State had not borne its 
burden to show that the search of the vehicle was lawful. They reached the same 
conclusion about Robinson's subsequent consent to allow the narcotics dog to 
search the van interior. Id, at 438. 
From the foregoing case,, a number of conclusions analogous to the case 
at a bar can be inferred: (1) that a "sniff by a trained narcotics dog does 
constitute a "search"; (2) that a "search" conducted by a dog without particular 
and articulable facts to sustain a warrantless search under the automobile 
exception does require voluntary consent; and (3) that without consent or 
particular and articulable facts establishing probable cause on the part of the 
officer, such a "search" violates the fourth amendment of.the U.S. Constitution 
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and Constitution of the State of Utah. 
In the case at bar, Deputy Watson testified he stopped the vehicle in 
question for exceeding the speed limit of 55 miles an hour. (R. 156 p. 12). After 
stopping the vehicle, the driver produced a valid Arizona driver's license. (R. 
156 p. 15). After he contacted his dispatcher for verification of the driver's 
license and vehicle plates, he got a certified narcotics detector dog from his 
police vehicle. (R. 156 p. 16-17). At that point, he had no particular reason to let 
the dog out of his vehicle. (R. 156 p. 17). He explained that he was going to 
walk the dog around the vehicle, but he did not obtain consent from any of the 
occupants in the vehicle. (R. 156 p. 17). Because it was only after the dog 
indicated a hit that the officer formulated articulable facts, which possibly gave 
rise to probable cause sufficient to make a warrantless search of the vehicle, the 
search was illegal under the automobile exception. (R. 156 p. 19-2 1). The 
burden is on the State to show that evidence obtained following illegal police 
conduct is attenuated from the illegality. See, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 
604 (1975). The State completely failed to make such a showing. 
Since Deputy Watson lacked probable cause to conduct the non-consensual 
search with the aid of his dog, the warrantless search of the vehicle that led to 
the discovery of the illegal marijuana, violated Defendants" Fourth Amendment 
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rights and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Additionally, the opening of the tailgate by Appellant could not have been a 
voluntary consensual act since the Defendant could not understand the inquires 
made by the Deputy, nor the consequences of compliance. Deputy Watson 
knew Appellant Juarez could not speak nor understand English. (R. 156 p. 15, 
19-20). Even knowing that, Deputy Watson removed Appellant from the vehicle 
and out of earshot of the only person at the scene who could understand English, 
or translate and continued to make inquiries of Appellant. In his attempt to 
comply with his perception of the Deputy's inquiries, Appellant, not knowing he 
could refuse, opened the tailgate and pulled out a suitcase that allowed Deputy 
Watson to observe the opening between the bed and the bed-liner. Deputy 
Watson then conducted a non-consensual and warrantless search that lead to the 
discovery of the contraband. (R. 156 p. 20). Deputy Watson had neither consent 
nor particular and articulable facts to support the warrantless search of the rear 
of the vehicle, nor under the circumstances could he justify his warrantless 
search under the plain view doctrine. Consequently, the warrantless search of the 
vehicle by the Deputy with the aid of his dog and the resulting "fruits of the 
poison tree" must be suppressed due to the non-consensual and coercive nature 
and circumstances surrounding the initial stop. 
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POINT II. DEPUTY WATSON UNLAWFULLY DETAINED THE 
DEFENDANT BY FAILING TO COMPLETE THE PURPOSE OF HIS 
INITIAL REASON FOR THE STOP AND INTERRUPTING THE FLOW 
OF THAT TRANSACTION TO PURSUE A SEARCH WITH HIS DOG. 
Extending the time of a traffic stop to do a dog assisted search of a vehicle 
has been upheld in other jurisdictions, but, in those cases, they had either 
reasonable, articulable suspicion, requisite probable cause or two officers, one 
working the traffic stop and the second handling the dog. The two-man 
operation satisfied the requirement in that jurisdiction of not extending the time 
required for the primary reason for the stop. State v Williams, 565 So. 2d 714, 
Fla. 3rd DCA (1990). The rule is otherwise in this jurisdiction. 
In the instant case, we have only one officer; one without requisite, 
reasonable, articulable suspicion; one who cannot simultaneously be on the radio 
in his car and out searching a vehicle with an aggressive dog (R. 156 p. 18II. 17-
19) while the subject vehicle is occupied by three adults, and a baby only one of 
which speaks English. In State V. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994), the 
Utah Supreme Court held as follows: 
* * * 
To determine whether a search or seizure is constitutionally 
reasonable, we make a dual inquiry: (1) was the police 
officer's action "justified at its inception"? And (2) was the 
resulting detention "reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
place"? Id. At 19-20. 
26 
* * * 
As to the first inquiry, a police officer is 
constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is 
"incident to a traffic violation committed in the officers' 
presence." State v. Talbot, 792 P. 2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990); see also State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 881-
83 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 975 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). An observed traffic violation gives 
the officer "at the least, probable cause to believe the citizen 
had committed a traffic offense." State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 
498,500 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that "[w]hen an officer 
observes a traffic offense—however minor— he has probable 
cause to stop the driver of the vehicle"); State v. Cole, 674 
P.2d 199,123 (Utah 1983). An observed violation, however, 
is not required. Stopping a vehicle may also be justified 
when the officer has "reasonable articulable suspicion that 
the driver is committing a traffic offense, such as driving 
under the influence of alcohol or driving without a license . . 
. [or that] the driver is engaged in more serious criminal 
activity, such as transporting drugs." State v. Lopez, 831 
P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see State v. Deitman, 
793 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987). In the words of the 
United States Supreme Court, as long as an officer suspects 
that the "driver is violating any one of the multitude of 
applicable traffic and equipment regulations," the police 
officer may legally stop the vehicle. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 
661. 
The second question is whether the stop was 
reasonably related in scope to the traffic violation, which 
justified it in the first place. Once a traffic stop is made, the 
detention "must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. 
Roger, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). Both the "length and [the] 
scope of the detention must be strictly tied to and justified 
by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 
1991) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-21). This means that 
an officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a 
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driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer 
check, and issue a citation. However, once the driver has 
produced valid drivers' license and evidence of entitlement 
to use the vehicle, "he must be allowed to proceed on his 
way, without being subjected to further delay by police for 
additional questioning." 
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) quoting United 
States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512,1519 (10th Cir. 1988) held that investigative 
questioning that further detains the driver must be supported by reasonable 
suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Deputy Watson had no suspicion of 
criminal activity (other than speeding) in the instant case. The Deputy legally 
stopped the Defendant's vehicle; called dispatch, did not commence writing the 
driver a citation for speeding, but rather initiated a search of Defendant's pickup 
truck. During direct examination by the Kane County Attorney, Colin R. 
Winchester at (R. 158, p. 53 11. 17 - 25, p. 5411. 1-10), Deputy Watson advises 
that the response time for verification from his Dispatcher ranges from a 
minimum of thirty seconds to as much as two minutes. At (R. 158, p. 53,11. 1 -
8), responding to Mr. Winchester's query of how soon after the stop Deputy 
Watson got out his dog he states:... "I then took their drivers licenses back to 
my truck, the time it would have taken to read their names into the radio, 
because I ran records on the vehicle and on the drivers license. And then after I 
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ran the records check over the radio, I got my dog out and went back to the car. 
So it couldn't have been more than just a couple of minutes. Probably about 
three or four. Four, I think." 
In that same period of time he could have finished his verification with the 
dispatcher, if he hadn't already, and been partially finished writing the citations 
for speeding and no child seat. He states that, after bringing the Defendant to the 
rear of the truck, and having a conversation with him, that he returned to his 
patrol vehicle and the radio dispatcher advised him that the occupants of the 
Juarez truck were not wanted by any authorities. (R. 158, p. 61,11. 5 - 13). 
In State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), the following facts were 
at hand: The officer observed the driver doing 42 mph in a 35 mph zone, while 
stopping the vehicle he observed the passenger of the pickup bending over, 
acting fidgety, turning left to right, and turning back to look at the officer. Also, 
when the stop was made, the driver met the officer between the two vehicles 
and the passenger continued to move about in the cab causing the officer to 
conclude that the passenger was trying to hide something. The officer then 
approached the passenger door; tapped on the window, and immediately opened 
the door, whereupon the officer saw marijuana and paraphernalia in the cab in 
plain view. In that case {Schlosser, Id.), the Utah Supreme Court sustained the 
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trial court's suppression of the evidence and, in doing so, wrote the following: 
The state argues that the officer's opening the door constituted an 
extension of an "investigative detention" and that the officer's 
actions were lawful because defendants' activities gave rise to a 
reasonable suspicion either of criminal activities or of danger to the 
officer's personal safety. Therefore, the State asserts that the judge 
erroneously applied a probable cause standard instead of a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion standard in the hearing on the 
motion to suppress. As stated above, Officer Howard's action of 
opening the car door constituted a search, not an investigative 
detention, and therefore, the probable cause standard was correctly 
applied by the trial court. However, even if the State's premise 
were accepted that no search occurred, the facts do not support a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion standard in the hearing on the 
motion to suppress. As stated above, Officer Howard's action of 
opening the car door constituted a search, not an investigative 
detention, and therefore, the probable cause standard was correctly 
applied by the trial court. However, even if the State's premise 
were accepted that no search occurred, the facts do not support a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity which is 
necessary to support the State's position. See State v. Dorsey, 
(Citation omitted); State v. Carpena, (Citation omitted); State v 
Swanagan, (Citation omitted). 
An investigative detention is justified if a police officer has a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the automobile's occupants 
are "involved in criminal activity." United States v. Hensley, 469 
U.S. 221, 226, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); Dorsey, 731 
P.2d at 1087, 1090. Additionally, an officer may search a vehicle 
for weapons if he has a reasonable belief that the suspect is 
dangerous and "may gain immediate control of weapons." Michigan 
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3481, 77 L.Ed.2d 
1201 (1983). In such instances, "due weight must be given, not to 
[the officer's] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' 
but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to 
draw from the facts in light of his experience." Terry v. Ohio, 392 
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U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868,1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
Here, Officer Howard had no probable cause, and no articulable 
suspicion either that his safety was in danger or that the occupants were 
engaged in criminal activity. He cited no safety concerns as the basis for 
his actions; he sought only to investigate the possibility that defendants 
were engaged in illegal activity, and for that reason he opened the 
passenger door. Here Deputy Watson, like officer Howard, had no 
probable cause, and no articulable suspicion that his safety was in danger 
or that the occupants were engaged in criminal activity. Unlike Officer 
Howard, Deputy Watson didn't even have anyone acting fidgety or 
nervous. Deputy Watson did have the fact that two (2) of the three (3) 
adult occupants couldn't speak English, and that is all he had when he 
gave his dog the command to search. 
Deputy Watson has offered nothing in the way of suspicion to justify 
his search of Appellant's vehicle, not even a hunch. The Deputy should 
have issued Mr. Juarez a citation for speeding and sent him on his way. 
POINT ffl. ABSENT VALID EXCEPTIONS TO THE 
WARRANT REQUIREMENT, DEPUTY WATSON FAILED TO 
OBTAIN VALID VOLUNTARY CONSENT TO SEARCH THE 
PICKUP TRUCK. 
Analyzing this action as is reflected in the transcript (R. 156 P 12,11. 3-4, 
19-20, 23-24, p. 13,11. 3-5), and Deputy Watson's report (R. 9) Watson sees the 
truck coming toward him, turns his radar gun on, clocks the Appellant at 68 in at 
55 mph zone, turns on him and pulls him over for a stop. So far so good. 
Deputy Watson makes contact with the driver of the vehicle, requests papers of 
not only the driver but all the occupants of the vehicle and finds them in good 
order. (R.156 p. 14,11. 25, p.15,11. 21-23, p. 16,11. 11-17). Rather than writing 
a ticket for speeding and sending the people on their way he decides to do a 
radio check with his dispatcher. (R. 9, R. 156 p. 1611. 21-22) (R. 158 p. 60,11. 15 
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-24). He has no suspicion of any criminal activity beyond the routine speeding 
violation. (R. 9, R.156 p. 17,11. 9-12). At this point Deputy Watson had no 
exceptions to the warrant requirement, he did not ask permission to search the 
Defendant's truck and yet, he then started a search of appellants' truck (R. 156 p. 
17,11. 13-25, p. 18,11. 1-11, p. 20,11. 25, p. 21,11. 1-2). If the dog indicating on 
the right seam of the tailgate, of the pickup truck, is probable cause, then Deputy 
Watson should have been obtained a warrant before tearing apart the rear or the 
Defendant's pickup truck on the highway (R. 9, R156 p. 21,11. 9-25). The 
separation of the bed-liner from double-sided tape in the western climate is no 
surprise. The movement of the rear end, left corner, of the bed-liner, one-half to 
one inch, after the tape loses its adhesion, should not arouse suspicion (R. 9, para 
4 R. 156 p. 20,11. 19-24); it doesn't create exigent circumstances. 
Deputy Watson did not ask any of the occupants of Appellant's truck if he 
could search the pickup and thus, obtained no consent. Appellant's actions in 
reaching for the suitcase does not constitute consent to search because he could 
not understand the language used by Deputy Watson. 
In State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court stated, 
at page 1257, the following: 
* * * 
Voluntariness is primarily a factual question, see Schneckloth v. 
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Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973), and the analysis used to 
determine voluntariness is the same without regard to whether the 
consent was obtained after illegal police conduct. If the court 
determines that the consent was not voluntary, no further analysis is 
required; the consent is invalid, and the proffered evidence must be 
excluded. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688; State v. Valdez, 748 P.2d 1050, 
1056 (Utah 1987); State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103,106 (Utah 
1980). 
In Arroyo, we said that "whether the requisite voluntariness 
exists depends on" the totality of all the surrounding circumstances 
— both the characteristics of the accused and the details of police 
conduct." 796 P.2d at 689 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226); 
accord State V.Robinson 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Our cases before Arroyo make clear that both the "characteristics of 
the accused" and the "details of police conduct' must be considered 
in determining whether a defendant's consent was actually a 
product of his or her free will. See Valdez, 748 P.2d at 1056; 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106 n. 14. The prosecution bears the 
burden of proving that the defendant's consent was voluntary. State 
v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375,1377 (Utah 1986) (per curium); 
(Citations omitted) 
The second determination to be made in deciding whether a 
consent following police illegality is valid is "whether the consent 
was obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality," Arroyo, 
796 P.2d at 688; see also Sims, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. At 6; cf. Allen, 
839 P.2d at 300, or in other words, "whether the 'taint' of the 
Fourth amendment violation was sufficiently attenuated to permit 
introduction of the evidence," Harris, 495 U.S. at 19 (citing Crews, 
445 U.S. at 471). The principle underlying the exploitation test is 
that the Fourth Amendment should not permit law enforcement to 
"ratify their own illegal conduct by merely obtaining a consent after 
the illegality has occurred." Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689. Arroyo's 
primary goal was to deter the police from engaging in illegal 
conduct even though that conduct may be followed by a voluntary 
consent to the subsequent search. 
* * * 
In the instant case, the prior illegality occurred when Deputy Watson 
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seized the defendant's pickup and its occupants by ordering them to roll up the 
windows and turn the vent blower on high and commenced his search of 
Appellant's pickup truck (R. 156 p. 17-18II. 141) (R. 158, p. 60,11. 20 - 24). 
Thereafter, he claims that appellant's actions (moving the suitcase) constituted 
consent to search. 
Clearly Appellant did not consent to the search of his truck and it cannot 
be argued in good faith that a man who does not speak English being spoken to 
in English, attempting to obey an officer, has voluntarily consented to the 
search by his actions. Further, there was no attenuation between the police 
illegality and the search of the bed of the pickup by the Deputy. 
POINT IV. THE SEARCH OF THE PICKUP BED WAS NOT 
JUSTIFIED BY "PROBABLE CAUSE" OR "INCIDENT TO ARREST" 
EXCEPTIONS TO THE SEARCH WARRANT REQUIREMENT OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES AND/OR THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Deputy Watson had not arrested anyone at the time he physically pulled the 
left rear end of the bed-liner aside, as far as he could get it to move. At that time 
and in daylight, he still needed a flashlight to see the packages, three to four feet 
toward the front of the truck bed, between the liner and the side wall of the 
pickup. His stated probable cause was that his Narcotics Detector Dog had 
indicated on the tailgate seam on the opposite side of the truck. When the 
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tailgate was opened and the dog jumped up onto the tailgate > 
the interior of the truck bed, the dog gave no indication of the presence of any 
drugs., whatsoever Deputy Watson should have been satisfied, if he believed in 
Ins ilog so sliongl}. lliat there was nothing forward 01 (he lailgate and stopped 
' r mquiiA in that poml I h.il should hi. .- i.„gau:c any perceived 
pi yjuauic cause. It was after I Ins poml thai In sn\v lltr lell lewall ol I IK IK A 
liner separated from the double-sided tape, 2 to I mi li liom <h«- WW ^ide^all of 
the pickup bed. It was his search of the left sidewali ihat first revealed what 
turned out to be marijuana. 
Further, no exigent circumstances existed. 
•art of Appeals points oul the nivii toi evident riicuinslaiu.es as lollop , 
* * * 
"™ Slate has the burden of proving that "the exigencies of ihe 
tination made [the search] imperative." Slate v Ashe, 745 
!
 258 (Utah 1987) (quoting Coolidge \. New I iampshire. 40 ; 
. 443. 445 (1971)). One type of exigent circumstance identifier. 
by the Supreme Court is when preservation H the evidence might 
be endangered by the delay in obtaining a ^.«: . mt '' '••••• ierh: - % 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-'71 n<W> 
* * * 
Probable cause is not the onb < 'uirement oi lite "automobile P Y W 
rule. 
In State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme 
Court clearly outlined the requirements of the "automobile exception" rule in 
Utah, as follow: 
* * * 
. . . there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the 
highway; the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's 
contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained. 
* * * 
For this exception to apply, the police must have probable cause to 
believe that the automobile contains either contraband or evidence 
of a crime and that they may be lost if not immediately seized ... 
* * * 
In the instant case, both requirements are absent. The Deputy had no 
probable cause. The truck was not going anywhere. 
Probable cause consists of facts and circumstances within (the officers') 
knowledge sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to 
believe that an offense has been or is being committed. The State bears the 
burden of establishing both probable cause and exigent circumstances in order 
for a warrantless search to fall within the automobile exception under Art. I 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, See, State v. Larrocco, 794 P.2d 460,470 
(Utah 1990). 
POINT V. ANY AND ALL ADMISSIONS DURING THE INITIAL 
STOP OF THE VEHICLE AND CONFESSIONS BY DEFENDANT 
WHILE IN CUSTODY WERE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF 
DEFENDANT'S MIRANDA RIGHTS AND THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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T,.viA an Officer oi" the law, (Trooper 1 );ivis) w ho speaks puor Spanish, 
questions a person who speaks no English, 'then acts on a perceived response to 
that interrogation, he occupies very thin ice if he testifies that the stringent 
ytiiieriients of Miranda have been met. One could wonder if the Defend;, nil 
"i mill li.iu: jioltui ii lu/itei Jiisvvei il lit had asked llie purpose ol a i>athroom 
man lie received when he ask llie i mi post »l ii liinvn Nit expliinaiioii lit iim 
receive in response to his inquiry, as lo the purpose eil* ;i Li\s \ n is i more 
accurate description < Ta judge, hi that instance, it was incunuvm upuii die :" 
v A llcers to speak Ihc w ords, in the best Spanish they" could muster, "Do you • 
waul an allornev preiienl'1 Involuntary admissions and confessions violate the 
* "^ \ v • •- *:. , • onsniuuoh. ^ee, 
Brown v. rviissi> *" •* i- •' i- e 
against self-int uii is niado uFFnv,uuie to the siai ^ i i , M / 
Amendment. See. MALLOY " ^ ; , ?-78 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). Lndei the 1 ^ 
Amendment, "line lest is whether the confession was free and voluntai ) ; 
Miii .M iiiK iUs or violence, not obtained by 
any direct or imnlied r •
 : •*, • *., 
improper influence/ Id, a t /. i iiC keystone lor do^mlining the admissibility of 
any statements obtained through custodial interrogation is found in '. Uranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U S 436 (1966) As a constitutional perquisite to any quesii^m 
an individual held for interrogation by a law enforcement officer must be warned 
in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent, any 
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a 
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. Id, at 444-445. 
The requirements of warning and waiver of rights is fundamental to the exercise 
of the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing 
methods of interrogation. Id., at 470. The determination of whether a defendant 
was aware of his rights and effectively waived them are assessed (1) on the 
background of the person being interrogated and (2) the circumstances 
surrounding the custodial interrogation. A defendant may effectually waive 
rights enumerated in the Miranda warning provided the waiver is made 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Id, at 444. Assessment of the 
knowledge the defendant possesses is based on his age, education, intelligence, 
and prior contact with authorities. Id, at 468-469. In determining whether a 
defendant effectually waives the rights enumerated in the Miranda warning, the 
State has the burden of proof to establish from the totality of the circumstances 
that the consent was voluntary. See, State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 
1985). A confession of the accused must be the product or result of free and 
unconstrained choice. See, State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah 1989). A 
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confession cannot be exacted by tint r 
influences, or promises, and still be deemed to »• 
639 P.2d 158, 160 (Utah 1981). The State bears the burden ol'pim ni|.» In ,n 
least a preponderance of the evidence, that the Appellant's confession is 
.s..ar> ^ . . , ^ « . <>„,,. 753 P.2d 439. 46"> TTlah 1988) T, «hc case at 
. - . . . \i!ida warn, i initial arrest of the 
yaiues and :\v ' -1 <. .iter Appellant 
was at the jail, the Appellant contends, tb * 
were obtained in violation of the principles espoused in Mirundc ' ' 
process rights, guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution and the Cons i l ium „, 
MM.: Male of i ilah, as there is no evidence, in the record, that his admissions were 
H)liinlrii\ know iiir mill mldligenlrs inadi I here is no evidence to support the 
oiliceis1 claims 11lal Ihr lonlrssion was fivrn s4iliiiil.iilis knowingls, and 
intelligently. To the contrary, indicntcc 'l~v\ h 
and equipment available at hand to create an electronically . v C O i W V U 1 V V U I U U l 
Liic Aiounda u a- -ungs on the highway, an*1 ai the jail during the en„._ 
•i..i .. - mat was not aum- * , • 6 p. 24 ll 15-25 p 2511 1-2, p "*2 
;, i. , ,<
 l; direct testimony and 
circumstantial c - ' ' * '^tantiat- cfenuan, , > ; „ t . ^ p 
was obtained through his ignorance of his hnuliiifiriil.i1 rHi1 and induuil I • iK 
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intimidating, restrictive, and coercive police investigative and interrogating 
techniques. (R. p. 1911. 9-25, p. 2011. 1-2, p. 2011. 4-8, p 23 11. 10-12, p. 23,11. 
19-20, p. 23 11. 8-21, p. 4111. 21-25, p. 42 1.1, p. 4211. 2-8, p. 5211. 21-25, p. 53 
11. 1-15. p. 611. 25, p. 6211. 1-3 p. 86-87, p. 6211. 16-25, p. 63 11. 1-6, p. 9711. 
14-25, p. 98 11. 1-18,112-113, p. 9911. 24-25, p. 100,11. 1-5, p. 10111. 14-18, 22-
24, p. 10211. 4-10, p 10211. 7-10, p. 11411. 2-7) (R. 110 para 28 and 31) (R. 157 
p. 811. 5-7). 
Trooper John Davis, in his Spanish, administered at the scene, and again 
at the jail, the Miranda warning. (R. 156 p. 30-32, 36). The court approved 
licensed interpreter critiqued the Spanish of the interrogating officer. (R. 65 
para 3). When translating the taped confession from Spanish to English, in the 
endnotes of the transcriber, Robert T. Behunin, 1202 W. 800 S., Cedar City, UT 
84720, (801) 586-1457, remarking about the bad conjugation of the verb "poner" 
stated: "the person asking the questions doesn't understand this rather basic verb 
structure." (R. 65 para 3). 
Thus, one could surmise from the pronunciation and the methods of combining 
words from English to Spanish, that Appellant lacked comprehension of, and/or 
any meaningful understanding of, the legal rights afforded within the Miranda 
warning and the significance and consequences of voluntarily waiving the rights 
contained therein. (R. 64 para 1). Paraphrasing and/or rendering of the language 
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by Trooper Davis, in asking Ihe questions anil in, ailm:.1 ,is Ihe ni(n| t iclei , aikloi 
,' \\i pellanf s lack o f u . u v . . « « j i n » of the context of the Fughsb language i i" 
~"
r
: probable than nut. thai the Appdlan : Juarez did not understand the rights 
athnviv\i i i i i iui^ut t.i'dtttia thus. Appellant could nol have effect i\ el) waived 
. I ' •< • - -oJ 104). 
dwpwuvi^ upon the particular f a r - * * ^ c , 
ii '• ding the background, experience and conduct of the a r - i ^ \ ! 
Woods, 868 P.2d 70, 86 (Utah 1993). After Miranda and duraig the in-custody 
I u^alion of Appeiiaml Juarez, he asked the purpose of a lawyer before 
making any admissions againsl interest. (1(. lM>p 101-102), hoope r Davis 
attempted lo explain 1o Ihe /\ppclLnil n l u l a l . nwn "i is hi l .il nn lune did he 
clarify 'that the Miranda warning allowed him to K*-v ^ -
the instant interrogation, and at no time did Trooper Davis su} ;; >u have uic 
, i»t to remain silent" nor did the Trooper, at 'that time, obtain a waiver from the 
*} N -• I .Individual held for interrogation must be 
' ^
1
 ni li l " a lawver a«id to have the 
lawyer with h im during interrogatioi i Mii'if^U iK i 11 ^ «n i ' I r nil^ \w 
effective and express exp; tilC (iciCliUdi ' ' : ; - : ' 
assurance that he is truly in the position to exercise it. Id, at 473 . From 
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Appellant Juarez question (R. 156 p. 10111. 14-18, 22-24) alone, one would 
surmise that he did not understand his right to consult with an attorney and his 
right to have an attorney present during questioning and, not the least of which, 
the right to remain silent or the consequences of waiving that right to remain 
silent. 
Other than the estimation by the officers themselves that Appellant did waive 
his rights, the State failed to produce any evidence that the statements, 
admissions, and/or confessions made by the Appellant were made voluntarily, 
knowingly and intelligently, or that the Appellant effectively waived his rights 
under Miranda, or the due process clause, of the U.S. Constitution or 
Constitution of the State of Utah. Therefore, any and all admissions and/or 
confessions by the Appellant must be suppressed 
Appellant was interrogated in the presence of three officers. Interrogation 
tactics and techniques employed while questioning defendants, make it more 
probable than not, that Appellant was coerced and intimidated into making 
statements, admissions and/or confessions against his penal interests. In State v. 
Ashdown, 296 P.2d 726, 731 (Utah 1956), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the 
general rule stated in 20 Am.Jur. Evidence' 508 (1939), which states: 
"[T]elling the accused that it would be better for him to 
speak or tell the truth does not furnish an inducement, or 
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sufficient inducement, to render objectionable j i MIMI'^ 'HHI 
thereby obtained., unless threats or proim . 
(emphasis added) 
In this instant case, threats were used • =-. it;f~ 62-86-87-
97-98, 112-11?^ 
Intern^ ui n techniques utilized b\ notice may not be so (Mill ii|>eous ni'l 
u»en ivc is in UMictunc Appellant • >»ii. <uiu induce him to talk when he 
iillicrwise would not have done so. *w ' >ntn /I'M' M I 1 IN l.lsi) 
I Utah 1986). 
In State v i irijjin, 754 P.2d 965, 970 (Utah 1988), the following 
examples ol coei ci vc interrogative language were held to be sufficient to 
w;irr,ii>1 suppress il iln usiiliniy confession: 
Lijn order for you to e - ' 
again then you're going 10 neea .v-&u ^ 
after that time and only after that time *» i 
to be reunited with your daughter iv 
receive any help for the problem. * admit 
there is a problem. Right \v.<:\ ', am >nK v. vo» ^nn one. 
But more charges are going io ii<ii«»\ 
It boils down to the fact urn I / v >\ and v*«u need some ; 
and we can get you that help 
Whether or not you admit u u> tin I m ^ouig to build a case ;_ 
\ oi i and I'm going to convict 
hi the case at bar, the oft : . i.. v
 :.s ig unci ,-ogations to 
induce statements, admissions, and/or conf.-s* »
 %J!M a maue tne 
following statements while iii.w. ^•>-"ti \t 
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... the first part of the conversation I basically was 
explaining to him the differences in his statement and 
his daughter's statement and I couldn't understand why 
he wasn't just... I mean he was caught... why he 
didn't just come out and get this over with so his 
daughter ... we could release his daughter and go 
home. I explained to him that at that particular point I 
wasn't able to release anyone; that everyone that was 
gonna be charged at this particular time. (R. 156 p. 411 
told him that his daughter was a suspect and that... 
that I believed that he knew what was going on and he 
could ... he would be the only one that could tell me 
she wasn't involved. (R. 156 p. 61). 
I told him that if she was arrested, the baby would have to be placed 
into foster care until someone could come up and pick her up. (R. 
156 p. 61-62) 
In response to questioning by the County Attorney, Trooper Davis testified 
as follows: 
... Mr. Juarez realized that what deputy Watson wanted to do was 
to arrange to have his daughter, Ms. Juarez, booked into jail and 
have the baby placed in a foster home at the time. At that point he 
decided to go ahead and cooperate and advise us of the ... of 
what he was doing, as far as the transaction with the narcotics. (R. 
156 p. 86) 
In response to Mr. Scarth's question about the number of times in both 
interviews any officer stated to Mr. Juarez something to the effect of: Come 
clean. Tell us what's going on, Trooper Davis made the following replies: 
Numerous times I'd say probably three of four times per 
interview, so roughly up to about 10. Dan Watson did tell Mr. 
Juarez that if he couldn't get to the bottom of it, his daughter 
would have to be booked. (R. 156 p. 97) 
Until Deputy Watson left the interrogation room to remove the child from 
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its mother, Defendant J uarez had denied .ill know Ivdyv of 'he piesena11 | ( 
j ;uird, (R. 156 p. 98, 113). li was only after Depill\ V\ atson removed the 
~
u;H from its mother that Defendant Juarez stak u, Oka>, 1 11 take the blame 
.» . ;••. h-u jfuing coercive language combined w ith the act of 
*• • L'K !
 t, .i.v . . . ,i , v.. . v - Tvare7 to talk \\ lien Tic 
^ v - - \ - ; : . • 111 IIII 11 
v^iiized by the officers and unuu ihc « t 
sustain Appellant's Motion to Suppress am u u u t i l l OLUXVII IV^I ILS , 
admissions, and/or confessions, made by Defendant. 
"™
T
°LTTSION 
I Vdsul on i "VjHii i v\ aiMHi s reason fo* the nm^1 stop, n routine traffic 
n (Tense, theeneounlei should have concluded wiih I he I >cpuly issuing a citation 
and releasing the vehirl* and ml1, oi nipaiil. lo < < mi (in IN OH Mien i. .o I k n nl< 
Watson, b> Ms own testimony, confirms the Inct he II.IKI no pnrlh iiLn or 
\ *1.ib1e facts no articulable reasonable suspicions, and no requisite probable 
?mwc to command the dog to -catch (he vehicle, and he did not seek e o n ^ ^ 
f
™™ ^ Appellant tp • passengers, for 'he dog to assist in the search. „ :aL 
VUM* ,»iv support iiuii <iii oiiivci <jLvsi>ico K- a narcotics dog looking for drugs, 
;. •; ^ ..;,.,... .*;*. T proi.uOie cause ^nch a search does 
M * * ! ' \ > * h!T. " > : -.1 ^ i , , . i . j . , ,
 t H o| | . Kail 
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Constitution. See, State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1990), State v. 
Larrocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990). 
Deputy Watson conducted an illegal search of Appellant's vehicle and this 
alone is ground for the Court to suppress all the evidence obtained by the 
officers, including that found under the bed-liner of the defendant's pickup 
truck. 
The State has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
statements, admissions, and/or confessions, made by Appellant, were obtained in 
accordance with principles espoused in Miranda, and that the Appellant 
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. There is 
circumstantial evidence and direct testimony that indicates the confession was 
obtained through coercion and Appellant's ignorance of his fundamental rights. 
The Appellant could not speak or understand English. (R. 156 p. 2011. 1-2). 
The translation by Trooper Davis as the interpreter is problematic. (R. 65 para 
3) Appellant Juarez's question regarding the purpose of a lawyer (R. 156 p. 101 
11. 13-18, 22-24) is liable to judicial inquiry. The State has produced no 
evidence, other than the statements of the interrogating officers, that Appellant 
understood and waived the rights afforded him under Miranda, the Fifth 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. In spite of the fact that they had recording 
equipment available to them at all times it was never used until the Appellant 
started telling them what they wanted to hear. A reasonable person doing 
translations, who admits to less than 100% fluency in the foreign language he is 
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-—-Vjng (R.156 p, 76) would have recorded 'the entire interrogation including 
• * la Yvai11ill;:> I \\o\\\\\ seem iin'oiih]PICIICIISIIPIC Ural »i liaint.il law 
enlorcenieni o\! seer would not recognize the benefit, even "the necessity, of such 
recoiu keeping. 
• Additionally, and as a result of faihiri ouvfusiil In IN Ihr IITIHIOII >; \ 
avanaok. ihe Siaie has failed to prove b\ : pn , e of the evidence thai 
the 1^ -?^ c* • •» * • .; . uiin^ ii. 
accordance ^ > methods esnoused in \fn\*n^u and I Mah case law. 
Sa * ue test .ill wliillic!" n 
confession H - -Mnii*n depends on the totality of1 • \ \ lanirs ,S'<v, «Sr/i//• • 
v, Mooref 69/ I1 Jil 233,236 Utah 1985). There is circmnfilantial evidence and 
direct testimony <11:• i 'iuppnit'i \\w m\\v\\\m\\ (liiii (In; i - ^M;> 
were obtained Ihrough coeicise police r-UcrroQation techniques and !• ^aves 
ji--ii.i.o . - K^^UHL .-. > i • M .appellant's lice and uneM ed 
j -oh i ^eput^ Watson threatened ••,cerate Appellant Juarez 
™ here was absolutely no evidence duii she possessed any know-
ma. 
eatened *~ rcmovc Appellant's infant grandchild to foster care 
» r ; ? \\ :ii^ :^ : • • [ ii' .mi il nil" .Ktualh itniim nig ihe infant 
*i*>\\ me mother coeiced Appellant Juarez to make a cnnlession when he had 
i-..iH
 ;/(• LK . ionk"tI}j»iii oi involvement in crinimal activity prior to 
that nine Improper miluences and coercive Indies rondei'nl A|i|u Ihtnt Jnaic '•• 
conlession involuntary. Involuntary admissions and eon legions violate the 
Miranda requirements and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and 
the Constitution of the State of Utah. The burden is on the State to show that 
evidence obtained following illegal police conduct is attenuated from the 
illegality. 
The State may assert that the statements made by the defendant following 
his arrest was not the product of constitutionally violative procedures. The Utah 
Supreme Court has addressed the issue of incriminating statements in light of the 
Fifth Amendment and the Miranda requirements. Specifically, that Court held: 
* * * 
The Fifth Amendment "protects individuals from being 
compelled to give evidence against themselves.... Although the 
United States Supreme Court... adopted the prophylactic 
Miranda warnings to preserve and reinforce the Fifth 
Amendment rights of individuals in certain custodial 
circumstances, those warnings are not themselves 
constitutionally secured, and a violation of the . . . Fifth 
Amendment may be found irrespective of whether Miranda was 
breached." 
* * * 
State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, (865 Utah 1998), quoting State v. 
Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1188 (Utah 1995); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 
470 U.S. 298, 306 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292 n. 1(1985). 
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 h CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden 
Issuance of warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in thejr per-
sons houses, papers and effects against "treasonable 
s S e s and seizures shall not be violated: and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly ta** 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to oe 
seized. 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be. searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro* 
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended: 
Section 77-7-15 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing 
or is attempted to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address 
and explanation of his actions. 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4696] 
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424] 
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (8'0D 644-5278 
Facsimile: (801) 644-2281 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MANUEL DOMINGUEZ JUAREZ, 
Defendant. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ] 
ANGEL D. RASCON, ) 
Defendant. ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Case No. 961600052 
) JUDGE K.L. McIFF 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 961600051 
JUDGE K.L. McIFF 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to Defendants' 
jointly considered motions to suppress on December 20, 1996. 
Prior to the hearing, the parties had submitted memoranda of 
points and authorities. The facts in support of the motions, and 
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the facts in opposition to the motions, had been set forth in the 
parties' memoranda, with citations to the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing. The Court reviewed the parties' memoranda 
prior to the hearing, and at the hearing, entered the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On April 20, 1996, Kane County Deputy Dan Watson was on 
duty and was traveling eastbound on U.S. Highway 89 in Kane 
County. He stopped the driver of a westbound pickup truck for 
exceeding the posted speed limit, 68 miles per hour in a 55 mile 
per hour zone. 
2. Mr. Juarez was the registered owner and driver of the 
truck. Mr. Rascon was a passenger. The truck was also occupied 
by Mr. Juarez's adult daughter and her infant child. 
3. Neither Mr. Juarez nor Mr. Rascon could speak English 
well, so Ms. Juarez interpreted the communications between them 
ana Deputy Watson at the scene of the stop. 
4. Deputy Watson obtained Mr. Juarez's driver license and 
vehicle registration, and returned to his vehicle to verify the 
documents through Kane County Dispatch. 
5. While waiting for the dispatcher's response, Deputy 
Watson took his certified narcotics detector dog, Rudi, out of 
his venicle. He had no particular reason to take Rudi out, but 
toe: Rudi near Defendants' vehicle and commanded her to sniff. 
Dep-cy Watson did not ask Defendants' consent, but informed them 
of his intentions. Deputy Watson's use of Rudi was consistent 
with his practice in approximately 70% of his traffic stops, 
where he, as a matter of routine practice, takes Rudi out of his 
vehicle and wal-ks her around the stopped vehicle. What he did in 
this case was consistent with his general practice, and was not 
something specifically directed to Mr. Juarez's truck to the 
exclusion of others. 
6. Rudi indicated on the driver's side seam of the truck's 
tailgate. Deputy Watson put Rudi back into his vehicle. Deputy 
Watson then asked Mr. Juarez, who could not speak English, out of 
Mr. Juarez's truck. Deputy Watson and Mr. Juarez proceeded to 
the rear of Mr. Juarez's truck, out of earshot of Ms. Juarez, 
who could speak and understand English. Deputy Watson then asked 
Mr. Juarez why Rudi was indicating on the truck. 
7. Mr. Juarez opened the tailgate and pulled a suitcase to 
the back of the tailgate. When he did so, Deputy Watson noticed 
that double stick tape was used to hold the bed liner to the 
truck bed, and that the bed liner had pulled away from the truck 
bed on the driver's side at the rear. 
8. Deputy Watson pulled the bed liner slightly away from 
the truck bed at that spot and used a flashlight to observe 
packages that appeared to be wrapped in tape. 
9. Mr. Juarez threw his hands up and stated in broken 
English, "Its not my pickup." 
10. Deputy Watson called dispatch and requested backup, 
then examined the space between the bed liner and the truck bed 
on the passenger's side of the truck, where he observed similarly 
wrapped packages. 
11. Utah Highway Patrol Trooper John Davis, who spoke 
Spanish, arrived at the scene and placed Mr. Juarez in the back 
of his patrol vehicle. 
12. Both officers removed Mr. Rascon from the passenger 
side of the truck and handcuffed him. They then removed Ms. 
Juarez and the infant from the truck and handcuffed her. 
13. Kane County Chief Deputy Allen Johnson arrived at the 
scene and the three adults, the child, and Defendants' truck were 
taken to the Kane County Jail. 
14. In the jail parking lot, the bed liner was removed and 
31 packages, weighing a total of 67.31 pounds of what was later 
determined to be marijuana, were removed from the space between 
the bed liner and the bed of the truck. 
15. At the jail, the three adults were interviewed 
separately interviewed by the officers. Trooper Davis 
interpreted during the interviews of Mr. Juarez and Mr. Rascon. 
16. At the scene and at the beginning of the interviews at 
the jail, the three adults were each given the Miranda warning. 
2ach agreed to speak to the officers, and each initially denied 
any knowledge of the marijuana. 
17. The officers interviewed one of the adults, then the 
next, then the next. Although there were recesses in each 
adult's interview as the officers moved from one adult to the 
next, the interviews were continuing interrogations, not 
subsequent interrogations. The combined interviews lasted 
approximately two to two and one-half hours. 
18. The interviews resulted in differing explanations 
regarding the ownership of the truck, the purpose of the trip, 
and whether Mr. Juarez had been in Utah before. Mr. Juarez 
denied having crossed the United States border or ever having 
been stopped in a vehicle where marijuana was located. That 
information was inconsistent with independent information which 
the officers obtained through law enforcement channels. 
19. When the officers came back to visit with Mr. Juarez 
the final time, they advised him that they were going to have to 
hold all three adults for further investigation. Until then, Mr. 
Juarez had denied any responsibility for the marijuana. The 
officers told Mr. Juarez that they thought he could supply the 
information as to who was involved, but that in the absence of 
that information, they would have to hold all three adults. 
20. The officers advised Mr. Juarez, as well as Ms. Juarez, 
that Ms. Juarez would be separated from her child, and the child 
would be placed in temporary foster care until somebody could 
come back and pick the child up. Mr. Juarez initially testified 
that the officers had told him that his daughter would not see 
her child again. However, he later acknowledged that the 
officers had told him that although his daughter and grandchild 
would be separated, no time frame for the separation was 
indicated. 
21. Ms. Juarez also gave conflicting testimony regarding 
the separation from her child. On direct examination, she stated 
that she thought foster care meant for a long time, but in cross-
examination, she acknowledged that the officers had told her that 
the child would be kept only until arrangements could be made for 
someone for come and get it. 
22. Although Ms. Juarez is not a United States citizen, she 
had lived in Chandler, Arizona for approximately 12 years and 
had attended grades 1 through 10 in the public school system in 
Chandler, Arizona. She had therefore been raised in and exposed 
to a society which would not allow a child to be summarily 
permanently taken from its parents. 
23. The officers did not threaten to take the child away 
permanently or even for a long time, but rather only until 
arrangements could be made for someone to pick it up. 
24. After Mr. Juarez was advised that all three adults 
would be held pending further investigation, and that foster care 
WOU— H be arranged for his grandchild, Deputy Watson left that 
rocm in order to advise Ms. Juarez that she would be booked. 
25. At that time, Deputy Watson took the baby from Ms. 
Jua.ez to the dispatching area. Because of the tender age of the 
child, it was necessary to make temporary foster care 
arrangements in order to be able to hold the mother in custody. 
It was appropriate to advise each of the three adults as to what 
was transpiring. 
26. Whether Mr. Juarez saw Deputy Watson carry the child 
past the room in which he was being interviewed was not clear 
from the record. Even if he did, that event was simply what the 
officers had told him would"happen because the child could not 
remain in the jail with its mother. 
27. Mr. Juarez agreed to speak with officers, and confessed 
that he had agreed to transport the marijuana for the sum of 
$3,000. He advised that Mr. Rascon had helped him load it, but 
was not to share in the profit. He assured the officers that his 
daughter was not involved. 
28. Based on Mr. Juarez's statements, Mr. Juarez and Mr. 
Rascon were held, but his daughter and grandchild were released. 
29. Mr. Juarez's decision to tell the truth was not the 
product of threats, but rather the product of his desire to avoid 
having his daughter being held in jail and separated from her 
child, even temporarily, for something she did not do, but that 
he did. The foundation for him telling the truth was his 
decision to accept the responsibility, which was rightfully his, 
rather than have his daughter suffer any adverse consequences. 
His confession was based on guilt and was reliable. 
\ 
30. During the second portion of the interview with Mr. 
Juarez, he had asked the officers what the purpose of a lawyer 
was. Trooper Davis told Mr. Juarez that lawyers explain the 
client's rights, tell the client what the laws are, what the 
client needs to do, and what the client can and can't do, 
relating to the situation in which the client finds himself. 
31. Ms. Juarez and her child were released from jail 
without being charged. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The initial stop of Mr. Juarez's truck was a legitimate 
stop for speeding. 
2. It was reasonable for Deputy Watson to ask for 
identification from the three adults, all of whom were of Spanish 
extraction and two of whom did not speak English. 
3. It was not unreasonable for Deputy Watson to have Rudi 
around the outside of the truck. 
4. Rudi's walk around the truck was not a search of the 
truck and did not violate the Defendants' Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
5. After Rudi indicated on the rear of the truck, it was 
reasonable for Deputy Watson to look and inquire further, before 
se::j.i:,g the Defendants on their way. 
\ 
6. The cursory examination of the bed liner was a 
reasonable extension of Deputy Watson's investigation, given that 
which had preceded it. 
7. When -Deputy Watson saw the taped brick-like packages, 
he was justified in continuing the search at the scene and beyond 
-- which resulted in discovery of the multiple brick-like 
packages weighing approximately 67 pounds. 
8. It would have been unreasonable for Deputy Watson to 
let the Defendants go during the progress of his investigation. 
9. After the packages were located, Deputy Watson was 
justified in arresting all three adults. 
10. Although the timing of Mr. Juarez's confession suggests 
that he was influenced by the announced intent to hold his 
daughter pending further investigation, and the knowledge that 
she would be temporarily separated from her child, that knowledge 
does not mean that his confession was not voluntary. 
11. Each of the adults understood and voluntarily waived 
their Miranda rights. 
12. Mr. Juarez's question about the purpose of a lawyer was 
insufficient to require officers to stop the interview. 
13. Mr. Juarez's confession was voluntary. 
XK 
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DATED this ( [ day of August, 1997 
BY THE COURT: 
K.L. 
District 
xO 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 30th day of July, 1997, I served a 
true and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each person or entity listed below: 
Jim R. Scarth 
P.O. Box 160 
St. George, Utah 84771 
Harold J. Dent 
P.O. Box 160 
St. George, Utah 84771 
(via first class mail) 
(via first class mail) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the // day of'-JU^ust, 1997, I served a 
true and correct signed copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to each person or entity listed below: 
Jim R. Scarth 
P.O. Box 160 
St. George, Utah 84771 
Harold J. Dent 
P.O. Box 160 
St. George, Utah 84771 
(via first class mail) 
(via first class mail) 
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COLIN R. WINCHESTER [4 696] 
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ERIC D. PETERSEN [7424] 
DEPUTY KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (801-) 644-5278 
Facsimile: (801) 644-2281 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MANUEL DOMINGUEZ JUAREZ, 
Defendant. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
ANGEL D. RASCON, ) 
Defendant. ) 
) ORDER ON MOTION TO 
) Case No. 961600052 
) JUDGE K.L. McIFF 
ORDER ON MOTION TO 
Case No. 961600051 
JUDGE K.L. McIFF 
SUPPRESS 
SUPPRESS 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to Defendants' 
jointly considered motions to suppress on December 20, 1996. 
Prior co the hearing, the parties had submitted memoranda of 
points and authorities. The facts in support of the motions, and 
/JVC O <~ / •*..-»-», 
the facts in opposition to the motions, had been set forth in the 
parties' memoranda, with citations to the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing. The Court reviewed the parties" memoranda 
prior to the hearing, and based thereon, entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that Defendants' motions to suppress the evidence are 
denied. 
DATED this [ / day of Mayr 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
A 
XV J. X I 
I certify that on the 30th day of April, 1997, I served a 
true and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS to each person or entity listed below: 
Jim R. Scarth (via first class mail) 
P.O. Box 160 
St. George, Utah 84771 
Harold J. Dent (via first class mail) 
P.O. Box 160 
St. George, Utah 84771 
Cathy Johnstone (via first class mail) 
P.O. Box 96 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the //** day ofd&f, 1997, I served a true 
and correct signed copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS to each person or entity listed below: 
Jim R. Scarth (via first class mail) 
P.O. Box 160 
St. George, Utah 84771 
Harold J. Dent (via first class mail) 
P.O. Box 160 
St. George, Utah 84771 
Cathy Johnstone (via first class mail) 
P.O. Box 96 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
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SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MANUEL JUAREZ, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
Case No. 961600052 
ASSIGNED JUDGE: K. L. McIFF 
This matter came before the Court for sentencing on May 14, 
1999. The State of Utah was represented by the Deputy Kane 
County Attorney, J. Christian Rasmussen. The Defendant was 
present and was represented by counsel, Jim R. Scarth. The Court 
had previously ordered that a pre-sentence investigation report 
be prepared by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and 
the report was received and reviewed by the parties and counsel 
STATE OF UTAH v. MANUEL JUAREZ 
CASE MO. 961600052 A 
prior to sentencing. The parties made sentencing 
recommendations. 
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. SENTENCE. On Count 1, Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a Third Degree Felony, 
Defendant is sentenced and ordered to serve 0 to 5 years in the 
Utah State Prison, and pay a fine and surcharge in the total 
amount of $9,250. The term of imprisonment is suspended. The 
fine and surcharge imposed are suspended except for a total of 
$2,500. 
2. ORDER OF PROBATION. Defendant is placed on 
unsupervised probation for a period of 36 months, subject to the 
following terms and conditions: 
a. Defendant shall serve one year in the Kane County Jail. 
b. Defendant shall pay at least $100 per month toward the 
fine and surcharge imposed. The first payment shall be 
due 30 days after Defendant's release from the Kane 
County Jail, and subsequent payments shall be due on or 
before the 1st day of each month thereafter until all of 
the unsuspended portion of the fine and surcharge has 
been paid in full. Payments shall be made to the Clerk 
STATE OF UTAH V. MANUEL JUAREZ 
CASE NO. 961600052 
of the Sixth Judicial District Court, 7 6 North Main 
Street, Kanab, Utah 84741. 
c. Defendant shall not use, possess, or have control of 
illegal controlled substances. 
d. Defendant shall provide a sample of his breath or bodily 
fluids, upon the request of any law enforcement officer. 
e. Defendant shall submit to a search of his person, 
residence, vehicle, and other premises under his control, 
upon the request of any law enforcement officer upon 
reasonable suspicion, without the necessity of a warrant. 
f. Defendant shall maintain full-time employment, full-time 
education, or a full-time combination of both. 
g. Defendant shall not commit any further violation of law. 
h. Defendant shall notify the Court if he is arrested for 
any reason. 
i. Defendant shall notify the Court of any changes in his 
address. 
3. CERTIFICATE OF PROBABLE CAUSE. Defendant need not 
serve any portion of the term of incarceration until after his 
penaing appeal is resolved, 
4. RIGHT OF APPEAL. Defendant has 30 days from date 
hereof m which to move to appeal the sentence of the Court. 
STATU ZF rJTAH v . MANUEL JUAREZ 
CASE *:o. 9 5 1 6 0 0 0 5 2 
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DATED this day of June, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judg 
STATE OF UTAH v. MANUEL JUAREZ 
CASE NO. 961600052 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 18th day of May 1999, I served a true 
and correct unsigned copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
to each person or entity listed below: 
Jim R. Scarth 
P. 0. Box 160 
St. George, UT 84770 
(via first class mail) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the /J^* day of June, 1999, I served a 
true and correct signed copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND 
SENTENCE to each person or entity listed below: 
Jim R. Scarth 
P. 0. Box 160 
St. George, UT 84770 
(via first class mail] 
Kane County Sheriff 
76 North Main Street 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Utah Highway Patrol 
126 East 100 South 
Kanab, UT 84741 
(via hand delivery) 
(via first class mail) 
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